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Abstract - One of the important features of Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) is Objective Function (OF). 
OF influences an IoT network in terms of routing strategies and network topology. On the other hand, detecting a combination of attacks 
against OFs is a cutting-edge technology that will become a necessity as next generation low-power wireless networks continue to be 
exploited as they grow rapidly. However, current literature lacks study on vulnerability analysis of OFs particularly in terms of combined 
attacks. Furthermore, machine learning is a promising solution for the global networks of IoT devices in terms of analysing their ever-
growing generated data and predicting cyber-attacks against such devices. Therefore, in this paper, we study the vulnerability analysis 
of two popular OFs of RPL to detect combined attacks against them using machine-learning algorithms through different simulated 
scenarios. For this, we created a novel IoT dataset based on power and network metrics, which is deployed as part of an RPL IDS/IPS 
solution to enhance information security. Addressing the captured results, our machine learning approach is successful in detecting 
combined attacks against two popular OFs of RPL based on the power and network metrics in which MLP and RF algorithms are the 
most successful classifier deployment for single and ensemble models.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The Internet of Things (IoT) can be described as the ever-growing global network of smart devices with built-in sensing features 
and communication interfaces such as Local Area Network (LAN) interfaces, sensors, and Global Positioning devices (GPS). It is 
expected that by 2022 we will have around 50 billion IoT devices scattered across the globe, a 140 percent increase compared to 
2018. Since 1999, when the IoT was conceived, the concept of these smart devices has evolved into a conceptual framework 
including augmented physical objects, heterogeneous devices and interconnection solutions to share information at scale, across 
the world (Atzori, Iera and Morabito, 2017). Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) is used for IPv6 over 
Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) and IoT networks. RPL link layers operate efficiently using nodes that 
connect through multi-hop paths to root devices; these devices are responsible for collating and distributing data. A Destination 
Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) is produced for each root device that accounts for node attributes, link cost, and 
Objective Function (OF). However, from a security point of view, RPL is a vulnerable protocol given that it does not integrate the 
security mechanisms needed to avoid intruders from unauthorized access to the data traveling across an IoT network. Due to this 
fact, RPL is exposed to several types of attack, (Sharma, Mishra and Jain, 2017) provided a concise table of RPL attacks for 
consideration. RPL nodes utilise OF to identify node of next hop based on power consumption and network metrics (Rehman et 
al., 2016). Minimum Rank with Hysteresis Objective Function (MRHOF) and Objective Function Zero (OF0) have been defined 
as two main OFs of IoT devices and RPL protocol by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) work group.  Detection and 
quick response to attacks against MRHOF and OF0 is difficult and the current research lacks study on vulnerability analysis of 
OFs. Additionally, little investigation has been done on automating the detection and response process particularly for the 
combined attacks against OFs on IoT networks. However, it is possible that Machine Learning (ML) and data mining can be used 
for anomaly-based intrusion detection with a focus on identifying attacks based on power consumption and network metrics (Le 
et al., 2016). 
 
There are four Research Questions (RQs) that will be addressed throughout this paper: 
 
• RQ1. Is there an available IoT dataset that is suitable to meet the research scope in this paper, or is the development of a 
novel dataset required? 
• RQ2. What is the impact of pre-processing (for example normalisation, feature selection, and sampling) on classifier 
performance to detect combined attacks against MRHOF and OF0? 
• RQ3. What is the most successful deployment of ML algorithms to detect a combination of attacks against MRHOF and 
OF0? 
• RQ4. Are ML algorithms more successful in detecting combined attacks against MRHOF or OF0? 
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In this paper, we use ML to detect a combination of attacks against MRHOF and OF0 based on power consumption and network 
metric features. Additionally, to conduct our experiments and due to the lack of suitable IoT datasets, we developed a novel dataset 
which is focused on IoT features and attack parameters including packet delivery ratio and power consumption of nodes in various 
combined attack scenarios. Detecting a combination of attacks against OFs is a leading-edge technology that will become a 
necessity as next generation low-power IoT networks continue to be exploited everyday as they grow quickly. For this, we 
considered combined attacks such as: Rank & Version Attack, Rank & Blackhole Attack, Decreased Path Metric Attack, as well 
as Rank & Sybil Attack. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we review the related work based on our research questions 
and a critical understanding of available quality sources followed by our research methodology in Sections III. This is trailed by 
simulated experiments in Section IV, results and analysis in Section V, discussions in Section VI, conclusion, limitations, 
recommendations in Section VII, and acknowledgement in section VIII as well as references. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
In this section, relevant academic papers are reviewed and discussed in five groups. IoT Methodologies, MRHOF and OF0 
Attacks, IDS Methodologies & Feature Selection, Datasets & ML Classifiers, Pre-processor & Balancing Techniques were 
identified as the five core topics. Due to page limitation, we have picked two papers from each category to discuss here. However, 
more related papers from each group, along with gap analysis for our novel approach, can be found in Table 1. Publications, 
arguments and literature were selected based on practical and simulation experiments, expert opinion, evaluation, analysis and 
contrasting views. Scholarly literature search engines, libraries and journals were used to identify strengths, weaknesses and gaps 
in research.  
 
With regards to IoT Methodologies, (Zarpelão et al., 2017) deliver a survey of IoT-IDS and discuss the use of ML, anomaly-
based approaches, intrusion detection based on power consumption and analysis of objective function behaviour which are relevant 
to our research in this paper. The authors discuss power consumption as a parameter that can be used to analyse normal behaviour 
profile to detect malicious activity, based on mesh-under and route-over schemes. Each node is required to monitor power 
consumption at specified sampling rates and report deviations from expected values. Deviations from expected values are deemed 
malicious activity and as such the node is removed from the routing table. The paper expands on the concept of node behaviour 
focused on power consumption and suggests that packet overhead and memory consumption are adequate metrics that can be used 
for IoT-IDS. Although the paper provided a broad overview on IoT-IDS, technical depth is limited. Additionally, it is difficult to 
understand a detailed approach for IoT-IDS using ML from the research alone. Moreover, (Rehman et al., 2016) discuss Rank 
Attack as an Objective Function (RAOF) vulnerability aimed at RPL protocol. In order for RAOF to be successful, an attacking 
node corrupts routing metrics so that neighbour nodes’ OF favour the attacker as a preferred parent node. The results of their 
simulation show the impact of the attack when considering a well-positioned attacking node within the RPL network. The paper is 
interesting since it identified a relationship between OF, power consumption, hop count and routing metrics when considering 
RAOF. However, it does not provide counter arguments to their approach. For example, a discussion on the relationship between 
power consumption and hop counts when considering an attack on routing metrics could have been explained in further detail. The 
paper provided a detailed analysis for OF vulnerabilities across RPL networks and the introduction of an attack that had not been 
identified in other research.  
 
With regards to MRHOF and OF, (Airehrour et al., 2017) present a trust aware RPL model to detect Selective Forwarding and 
Blackhole attacks in IoT networks. The trust aware model is compared to MRHOF and OF0 to understand if their proposed solution 
is successful. Addressing their results, Selective Forwarding attacks against the trust aware model were able to be gradually and 
significantly reduced. This includes the isolation of malicious nodes. However, MRHOF and OF0 were not able to detect or isolate 
Selective Forwarding attacks. Additionally, while the trust aware protocol was able to detect and isolate Blackhole attacks through 
analysis of sent packet sequence and received sequence ID, MRHOF and OF0 were not able to do so. They also did not review or 
discuss in detail the techniques used by MRHOF and OF0 to detect and isolate malicious nodes. The lack of research in this area 
is significant to our work in this paper. Moreover, (Airehrour et al., 2018) discuss Secure Trust Protocol (SecTrust-RPL) designed 
to detect and isolate Rank and Sybil attacks through node trust relationships. Performance of SecTrust-RPL is compared to standard 
RPL protocol integrating with MRHOF and OF0. MRHOF is identified as a superior RPL protocol over OF0 based on performance 
metrics when considering network flow and resource. When considering Rank and Sybil attack alone, MRHOF demonstrates 
higher vulnerability than SecTrust-RPL. Although SecTrust-RPL has been identified as being a more secure protocol over MRHOF 
and OF0, there was no discussion around IDS that can be used with OF and RPL protocol. This is relevant to our research scope 
in this paper as RPL and OF may not be required to detect and isolate attacks if ML can be used with IDS. Experiments for MRHOF 
and OF0 utilising a suitable IDS compared to SecTrust-RPL would have provided a fair evaluation when considering IoT security.  
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With regards to IDS Methodologies and Feature Selection, (Sheikhan and Bostani, 2017) discuss a security mechanism to detect 
attacks against IoT networks based on a distributed architecture. Their proposed method is focused on using ML to identify 
Sinkhole and Selective Forwarding attacks that deviate from normal and abnormal behaviour. Addressing their results, the anomaly 
detection successfully identifies 80.95% of Sinkhole and Selective Forwarding attacks with a false alarm rate of 5.92%. The 
misuse-based detection was able to identify 97.88% of Sinkhole and Selective Forwarding attacks with a false alarm rate of 1.96%. 
Although misuse-based detection was able to identify a higher rate of Sinkhole and Selective Forwarding attacks with a low false 
alarm rate, this method is only able to detect known attacks. Although, the article highlights the significance of selecting noteworthy 
behaviour features including packet drop rate, packet receive rate, maximum hop count and average latency, further analysis will 
be required to select features relevant to OF attacks. (Napiah et al., 2018) discuss Compression Header Analysis Intrusion Detection 
System (CHA-IDS) coalesced with ML to detect 6LoWPAN and RPL combination attacks: Hello Flood, Wormhole and Sinkhole. 
CHA-IDS is focused on identifying anomaly and signature-based features for 6LoWPAN intrusion detection through raw data 
collection and analysis by means of six ML algorithms (MLP, SVM, J48, Naïve Bayes, Logistic, and Random Forest). They 
provide quantitative data suggesting CHA-IDS performs better than other 6LoWPAN IDS models for combined attack detection. 
CHA-IDS applies compression header data for 6LoWPAN as a detection feature in contrast to SVELTE and PONGLE that utilise 
rank and received signal strength indicators. Destination port, context identifier, destination context identifier, next header and 
pattern identified abnormal routing activities were used with ML algorithms to successfully detect attacks. Addressing their results, 
J48 was the most successful ML algorithm across a combined dataset while Random Forest ranked second. The strengths of the 
paper include research on 6LoWPAN and RPL vulnerabilities and flaws in current IDS methods. 
  
With regards to Datasets and ML Classifiers, (Buczak and Guven, 2015) discuss a range of ML and data mining algorithms and 
classification techniques based on public datasets for intrusion detection. An overview of publicly available datasets is provided 
comprising: DARPA 1998/1999/2000, KDD 1999, NetFlow, tcpdump, DNS and SSH datasets. It is highlighted that during a 
research phase it will be important to ensure ML methods are trained using the same dataset to ensure comparison with other 
research is reliable. However, despite KDD 1999 being the best available labelled dataset, it is limited by attacks that have occurred 
since the dataset was produced. This may be an issue when considering a reference dataset for use with MRHOF, OF, RPL and 
IoT. Moreover, (Alam et al., 2016) present a paper on eight data mining algorithms: ANNs, Deep Learning ANNs (DLANNs), 
C4.5, C5.0, SVM, Naïve Bayes (NB), K-Nearest Neighbours and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) for use with IoT. Their 
research aim is to understand if conventional data mining algorithms work for IoT datasets and if not, are new algorithms required. 
For their research, three sensor datasets from University of California Irvine (UCI) data repository were provided. Results conclude 
DLANN, ANN, C4.5 and C5.0 performed better than LDA, NB, NN and SVM when considering accuracy and elapsed time for 
IoT datasets. C4.5 and C5.0 were identified to provide high accuracy and processing speed whilst remaining memory efficient. 
DLANNs and ANNs memory efficiency was poor and computationally expensive although identified as having the highest rates 
of accuracy. The paper discusses an area of research that was difficult to identify during literature review given that most research 
into ML and IoT utilise DARPA or KDD datasets. Although the paper includes novel research into an area not commonly explored, 
the paper would have benefited from a detailed discussion around the three datasets provided by UCI.  
 
With regards to Pre-processor and Balancing Techniques, (Yin and Gai, 2015) discuss the challenges of data mining and ML 
relating to new and enormous data types introduced to solve complex problems. The paper discusses classification methods, pre-
processing, feature selection, and data sampling. The publication explains that there are many classification algorithms available 
that are mostly based on balanced high-quality datasets. Pre-processing is explained as a common method used to improve the 
accuracy of a dataset by reducing the number of features selected and by sampling well. Their experimental activity is designed to 
understand how to achieve and improve pre-processing techniques to deliver high-quality datasets. C4.5 classifier was the only 
algorithm used during experimentation to eliminate conflicting results across a range of 12 datasets. Results conclude that the 
accuracy of a classifier is more reliable when feature selection is conducted prior to sampling data. In the event that data is largely 
imbalanced, experimental results conclude that it is better to under sample data rather than over sample when considering minority 
class. The paper could have benefited with the inclusion of other pre-processor stages into experimental activity to improve the 
accuracy of a dataset further.  
 
Critical analysis of the current literature identified the following key areas of interest to address in this paper: power consumption 
and network related metrics, combination of IoT attacks, MRHOF & OF0 vulnerability analysis, feature selection and the 
development of a novel dataset based on IoT attacks. For instance, unlike (Zarpelão et al., 2017) and (Napiah et al., 2018), our 
work in this paper includes the combination of MRHOF and OF0 attacks considering power consumption and network-related 
metrics as part of a ML-IDS. Furthermore, unlike (Buczak and Guven, 2015) and (Yin and Gai, 2015), a novel IoT dataset has 
been developed focused on MRHOF and OF0 attacks including pre-processing techniques, feature reduction, sampling and 
normalisation. Additionally, as far as we are aware, no one else has successfully employed time series ML classifiers alongside a 
novel IoT dataset, whilst detecting a combination of attacks against multiple objective function (e.g. OF0 and MRHOF) based on 
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network and power consumption metrics. Table 1 provides a summary of our gap analysis based on the most relevant reviewed 
quality papers. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Our Gap Analysis 
Author Gap Analysis for Novel Approach 
IoT Methodologies 
Zarpelão, B. B. et 
al (2017)  
The paper identified a gap using ML and IDS based on power consumption. Power consumption metrics will be in the scope of our 
work. 
Rehman, A. et al  
(2016)  
The paper identified a gap using ML & IDS based on power consumption and hop count for RAOF. Power consumption and hop 
count will be in the scope of our work.  
Le, A. et al  
(2016)  
The combination of attacks have not been considered. Power consumption and dropped packet features could be used as a novel approach 
to anomaly-based detection. A combination of IoT attacks along with power consumption and dropped packet will be in the scope 
of our work.  
MRHOF and OF0 Attacks 
Airehrour, D. et al 
(2017)  
Research failed to detect individual attacks against OF0 and MRHOF. MRHOF and OF0 will be in the scope of our work for each 
IoT combination attack.  
Airehrour, D. et al 
(2018)  
The paper identified a gap for detecting/isolating a combination of Rank and Sybil attacks within MRHOF and OF0. A combination of 
Rank and Sybil attack along with MRHOF & OF0 will be in the scope of our work for each IoT combination attack.  
Mehta, R. and 
Parma, M. (2018)  
The paper identified a gap that possible OF attacks should be detectable. A combination of IoT attacks along with MRHOF & OF0 
will be in the scope of our work for each IoT combination attack.  
IDS Methodologies and Feature Selection 
Sheikhan, M. et al 
(2017)  
Research failed to detect unknown attacks using selected features for misuse-based detection. Power consumption and dropped packet 
metrics will be in the scope of our work.  
Mayzaud, A. et al 
(2016)  
Despite authors claiming their research as a feasible solution for anomaly-detection for IoT, there is no evidence of detection for a wide 
range of attacks beyond DAG. A combination of IoT attacks will be in the scope of our work.  
Lee, T.H. et al  
(2014)  
OF and MRHOF are not discussed within discussion of detecting malicious activity based on power consumption and network flow. 
MRHOF and OF0 for each IoT combination attack along with power consumption, hop count and dropped packet metrics will 
be in the scope of our work.  
Sousa, N. et al  
(2017)  
The paper discussed OF-FL, CAOF and other relevant OF routing metrics and then excluded them during simulation. MRHOF and 
OF0 will be in the scope of our work for each IoT combination attack.  
Napiah, M. N. et 
al (2018)  
The paper discussed reducing features from 77 to 5 removing power consumption to ensure ML algorithms were efficient. Power 
consumption metrics along with feature reduction strategy will be in the scope of our work.  
Datasets and ML Classifiers 
Haq, N. et al  
(2015)  
The paper reviews 49 related studies and highlights considerations to be made when developing a ML-IDS. ML approach, classifier 
methods, suitable algorithms, datasets and features selection are in the scope of our work.  
Nannan, L. et al 
(2018)  
Research identified a high false alarm rate for anomaly detection. ML approach, classifier methods, suitable algorithms, datasets 
and features selection are in the scope of our work.  
Buczak, A. and 
Guven, E.  
(2015)  
KDD 1999 is limited by attacks that have occurred since the dataset was produced. This includes IoT attacks. The identification or 
development of a novel dataset focused on IoT features and attacks is in the scope of our work.  
Alam, F. et al  
(2016)  
The paper identified little research into the use of conventional ML algorithms with IoT datasets. The identification or development 
of a novel dataset focused on IoT features and attacks along with ML approach, classifier methods, suitable algorithms, datasets 
and features selection are in the scope of our work.  
Pre-processor and Balancing Techniques 
Yin, H. and Gai, 
K. (2015)  
The paper reviews 12 datasets and highlights considerations to be made when developing an imbalanced dataset. Pre-processor 
techniques, feature extension, sampling as well as train, test and validate dataset are in the scope of our work.  
 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The aim of this paper is to use ML to detect a combination of attacks against OF0 and MRHOF, as two popular OFs for RPL 
protocol, based on power consumption and network metrics using a novel dataset. These findings will build on previous research 
in the field to produce a novel research. Therefore, the considerations include:  
 
• Identification and development of a novel dataset focused on IoT features and attacks 
• Identifying the most successful deployment of ML algorithms and classifiers 
• The impact of pre-processing, normalisation, feature selection and sampling on performance of ML algorithms and 
classifiers 
• Employing and assessing the success rate of detecting a combination of attacks against OF0 and MRHOF  
In this paper, eight experiments have been developed and presented based on the remarks identified during gap analysis presented 
in Table 1. Further detail will be provided during the simulated experiments. Our research methodology follows CRISP-DM 
(Shafique and Qaiser, 2014) that provides a structured approach for ML-based projects. We employed the six phases of CRISP-
DM as follows: 
 
• Business Understanding: (Literature Review, Development of Research Questions, Project Methodology, Gap Analysis, 
Research Aims) 
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• Data Understanding: (Exploring Datasets) 
• Data Preparation: (Data Pre-processing) 
• Modelling: (ML Algorithms and Classifiers) 
• Evaluation: (Performance Evaluation) 
• Deployment: (This phase is out of the scope of this paper and will be discussed during future recommendations) 
IV. SIMULATED EXPERIMENTS  
This section is designed to outline simulated experiments conducted following CRISP-DM process based on our research 
methodology. It includes data exploration, pre- processing, ML classifiers, classifier ensemble, and feature selection. The 
experiments will be run a number of times in a consistent manner to ensure the integrity of results. They are designed as follows.  
  
✓ Experiment 1 – Pre-processed Dataset: Considering All Attributes and Metrics  
✓ Experiment 2 – Normalisation: Considering All Attributes and Metrics  
✓ Experiment 3 – Normalisation: Considering Network Attributes and Metrics  
✓ Experiment 4 – Normalisation: Considering Power Attributes and Metrics  
✓ Experiment 5 – Considering Feature Selection  
✓ Experiment 6 – Considering Classifier Ensemble  
✓ Experiment 7 – Considering Detecting Attacks Against MRHOF and OF0  
✓ Experiment 8 – Considering Detecting Attacks Against MRHOF and OF0 with Balanced Class  
 
1. Exploring Datasets  
A range of approaches were considered during dataset exploration including publicly available datasets, privately-owned 
datasets, implementation of an IoT lab to capture relevant data and IoT simulation.  
Publicly available datasets including DARPA 1998/1999/2000 and KDD 1999 were considered since they are used in 71% of 
ML research experiments (Buczak and Guven, 2015). Despite these datasets being available and well labelled they do not have 
examples of attacks that have occurred since the datasets were produced. This is presenting an issue when considering attacks 
against OF0, MRHOF, RPL and IoT. Leading research professionals, universities and corporate organisations were approached 
and asked to provide raw datasets for research purposes. For security, privacy and the protection of intellectual property each of 
these organisations were unwilling to share their privately-owned datasets. The implementation of an IoT sensor lab was considered 
but was unfeasible due to the limited budget and geographic location of available resource. 
The identification and development of a novel dataset focused on IoT features and attacks was therefore conducted using 
simulation. (Alam et al., 2016) acknowledge this approach as difficult and time consuming requiring significant work to collect, 
label and pre-process an IoT dataset to ensure accuracy of results. A simulation dataset was produced to meet project scope using 
Contiki and Cooja. The raw dataset was provided as a project resource to understand, analyse and evaluate prior to data pre-
processing and modelling ML algorithms to detect attacks against OF0 and MRHOF.  
The dataset contained 24 attributes based on network and power metrics. They are all presented and detailed in Table 2. The 
dataset also includes 418 instances. Attribute and incident metrics were captured in a Contiki and Cooja simulation environment 
from various sensors during normal activity, and in every 30 seconds whilst under attack. The simulation was configured with 
eleven network nodes and one malicious node. The malicious node can be seen in Figure 1 labelled as number twelve.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Simulation Environment 
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Benign activity and four combined malicious attacks were monitored during the simulation scenarios. The malicious attacks 
include Rank & Version, Rank & Blackhole, Rank & Sybil and Decreased Path Metric against OF0 and MRHOF. Malicious and 
benign activities can be identified as attribute 23 in our dataset and is the selected class for our experiments. The class is imbalanced. 
This will be rectified during the data pre-processing phase. 
 
Table 2: Explanation of Dataset Features 
Feature Remarks 
Node  Node ID  
Received  Packets successfully received  
Dups  Duplicate packets received  
Lost  Estimated lost packets  
Hops  Average number of hops  
RtMetric  Average routing metric  
ETX  Expected transmission count  
Churn  Next hop change count  
Beacon Interval  Broadcast by node to sync RPL network  
Reboots  Total number of reboots  
CPU Power  Average CPU power consumption  
LPM Power  Average low power mode consumption  
Listen Power  Average listen power  
Transmit Power  Average transmission power  
Power  Average power consumption  
On-time  Power measure time  
Listen Duty Cycle  Percentage time listening signal is active  
Transmit Duty Cycle  Percentage time transmission signal is active  
Avg inter-packet time  Average delay between packets  
Min inter-packet time  Minimum delay for the packet to arrive  
Max inter-packet time  Maximum delay for the packet to arrive  
Simulation time  Average simulation time  
Malicious / Benign  Benign activity or type of attack  
Objective Function  MRHOF or OF0  
 
2. Data Pre-processing 
Data pre-processing phase is designed to prepare the raw dataset for our eight experiments. Pre-processing and data reduction 
were essential phases of the project. Therefore, sufficient time was spent ensuring a suitably labelled dataset was created to provide 
high quality results for analysis. Data pre-processing is aimed at reducing the complexity of a dataset so ML models can process 
data more accurately and faster than a raw dataset. When implementing a data mining process, which is CRISP-DM in this paper, 
pre-processing often requires more effort and time than the entire data analysis process in excess of 50% total effort (Ramírez-
Gallego et al., 2017). The dataset in Table 3 shows a representative example of some of the complex attributes and instances that 
we captured over the simulation scenarios in this paper. For the data pre-processing phase of this research, we have picked: data 
cleansing, transformation & feature reduction, normalisation & data analysis, sampling, as well as training, testing and cross-
validation stages. They will be applied on our raw dataset as follows. 
 
2.1. Data Cleaning, Transformation & Feature Reduction 
The raw dataset seen in Table 3 was reviewed and issues were identified such as missing, incomplete and inconsistent values. 
Additionally, the irrelevant data and errors were identified. To reduce the complexity of the 10,032 entries within the raw dataset, 
data cleaning and transformation was conducted to represent all data in a standard numeric form. Table 4 describes the steps taken 
for each feature. 
Features that were of no benefit to the ML model, nor did they contain relevant data, were removed from the dataset. Similarly, 
instances were reviewed and the entries containing no predictive power were removed reducing total instances from 418 to 338. 
Entries that contained null values or errors were replaced with the mean value for that entry. At this stage, the initial pre-processed 
dataset was completed and was used later in the project post normalisation and sampling. It was important to use this dataset for 
initial assessment and comparison against the final pre-processed dataset to understand the effect that normalisation has on overall 
performance.  
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Table 3: Raw Dataset 
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1.1 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 40 m-
rankandversion 
mrhof 
2.2 60 0 1 3.017 1040.183 48.771 1 1645266 0 0.3859 7756254 0.8725 138000 40 m-
rankandversion 
mrhof 
3.3 62 0 1 1.000 512.000 16.000 0 1643451 0 0.4022 790122 0.8768 113000 40 m-
rankandversion 
mrhof 
4.4 59 0 0 2.000 773.051 32.000 0 1723711 0 0.3543 717160 0.7488 113000 40 m-
rankandversion 
mrhof 
5.5 63 0 0 1.143 573.127 19.048 4 1605000 0 0.4258 787136 0.9806 118000 40 m-
rankandversion 
mrhof 
6.6 61 0 2 1.098 537.180 17.574 2 1667459 0 0.4715 797966 1.0172 204000 40 m-
rankandversion 
mrhof 
7.7 59 0 1 2.000 770.237 32.000 1 1668305 0 0.4091 722396 0.9103 116000 40 m-
rankandversion 
mrhof 
8.8 59 0 0 2.000 771.576 32.059 0 1724813 0 0.3958 723483 0.7992 116000 40 m-
rankandversion 
mrhof 
9.9 58 0 0 2.000 770.603 32.000 0 1728568 0 0.4448 713151 0.8766 117000 40 m-
rankandversion 
mrhof 
10.1 59 0 0 2.000 774.186 32.000 0 1690525 0 0.3749 663158 0.7730 83000 40 m-
rankandversion 
mrhof 
11.1 59 0 0 3.000 1036.542 48.167 0 1701491 0 0.3573 736572 0.7743 115000 40 m-
rankandversion 
mrhof 
1.1 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 10 b-
rankandblackhole 
OF0 
2.2 23 0 0 3.000 1024.000 48.000 0 1167913 0 0.3794 282283 0.7976 104000 10 b-
rankandblackhole 
OF0 
3.3 23 0 0 1.000 512.000 16.000 0 1099521 0 0.3870 277460 0.7298 111000 10 b-
rankandblackhole 
OF0 
 
 
Table 4: Data Pre-processing Steps 
Feature Remarks 
Node  Rounded to 0 decimal places  
Received  No change  
Dups  Feature removed  
Lost  No change  
Hops  Rounded to 0 decimal places  
RtMetric  Rounded to 0 decimal places  
ETX  Rounded to 0 decimal places  
Churn  No change  
Beacon Interval  No change  
Reboots  Feature removed  
CPU Power  Converted from W to fW (1×10 power−15)  
LPM Power  Converted from W to fW (1×10 power −15)  
Listen Power  Converted from W to fW (1×10 power −15)  
Transmit Power  Converted from W to fW (1×10 power −15)  
Power  Converted from W to fW (1×10 power −15)  
On-time  No change  
Listen Duty Cycle  No change  
Transmit Duty Cycle  No change  
Avg inter-packet time  No change  
Min inter-packet time  No change  
Max inter-packet time  No change  
Simulation time  Feature removed  
Malicious / Benign  All benign and malicious activities were 
grouped and values converted to numeric.  
1 = Rank and Version Attack  
2 = Benign Activity  
3 = Rank and Blackhole Attack  
4 = Decreased Path Metric Attack  
5 = Rank and Sybil Attack  
Objective Function  All values were converted to numeric.  
1 = MRHOF, 2 = OF0  
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2.2. Normalisation and Data Analysis  
Normalisation is a scaling technique that is used to provide a new range of data from an existing range. Min-Max normalisation 
can be used to fit data from one range into a predefined boundary in another. Due to the dataset containing complex numbers, 
statistical analysis was conducting. Additionally, standard deviation was used to categorise data in a nominal format to achieve the 
aim of predefined boundaries (Linn et al., 2016). The average value of each attribute was taken, and the standard deviation was 
calculated. A boundary range between 1 – 14 was determined based on the diagram presented in Figure 2. For example, numbers 
7 & 8 represent the most normal behaviour, or behaviour closest to mean, and numbers 1 & 14 represent the most abnormal 
behaviour or behaviour furthest from mean, Figure 2. Despite feature reduction condensing entries to 7,098, an automated system 
was developed to produce a new range of data from the existing range based on standard deviation and boundary selection to 
ensure data normalisation was accurate and timely when dealing with large datasets.  
 
 
Figure 2: Normalisation Boundary Range Based on Standard Deviation 
 
The dataset in Table 5 shows a representative example of the attributes and instances that have undergone data cleansing, 
transformation, feature reduction and normalisation phases of data pre-processing stage. As can be seen, all of the values are 
numeric and fall between the boundary range of 1 -14. The dataset is now in a format that is suitable to be loaded into WEKA [33] 
and converted to .arrf file prior to sampling and creating training, testing, and cross-validation datasets. WEKA is a popular and 
powerful tool for data mining and machine learning. 
 
Table 5: Final Pre-processed Dataset 
N
o
d
e 
R
e
c
eiv
e
d
 
L
o
st 
H
o
p
s 
R
tM
e
tr
ic 
E
T
X
 
C
h
u
r
n
 
B
ea
co
n
 
In
te
r
v
a
l  
C
P
U
 P
o
w
e
r
  
L
P
M
 p
o
w
e
r 
L
iste
n
 P
o
w
e
r 
T
ra
n
sm
it  
P
o
w
er 
P
o
w
er 
O
n
-tim
e 
L
iste
n
 D
u
ty
 
T
ra
n
sm
it 
D
u
ty
 
A
v
g
 In
te
r 
M
in
 In
te
r 
M
a
x
 In
te
r 
O
F
 
M
a
l/B
e
n
 
2 8 1 3 12 13 1 9 7 8 7 7 7 9 7 7 7 8 7 1 1 
3 9 1 1 4 4 0 9 7 7 7 7 7 9 7 7 7 6 6 1 1 
4 8 0 2 8 8 0 10 6 9 6 6 7 8 6 7 7 8 6 1 1 
5 9 0 1 5 5 4 9 8 7 8 8 8 9 8 8 7 8 7 1 1 
6 9 2 1 4 4 2 9 9 5 8 7 8 9 8 7 7 7 6 1 1 
7 8 1 2 8 8 1 9 7 7 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 6 6 1 1 
8 8 0 2 8 8 0 10 7 8 7 6 7 8 7 7 7 6 6 1 1 
9 8 0 2 8 8 0 10 9 6 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 6 6 1 1 
10 8 0 2 8 8 0 9 7 8 7 6 7 8 7 7 7 6 6 1 1 
11 8 0 3 12 12 0 9 6 9 7 6 7 8 7 7 7 7 6 1 1 
2 4 0 3 12 12 0 5 6 9 7 6 7 4 7 7 6 8 6 2 2 
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9 4 0 2 8 8 0 5 9 6 8 8 8 4 8 8 7 8 6 2 2 
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11 4 0 3 12 12 0 5 6 9 7 6 7 4 7 7 7 7 6 2 2 
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2.3. Sampling 
Prior to conducting sampling for the final pre-processed dataset, some housekeeping was performed within WEKA. Package 
Manager was used to load numeric to nominal format, randomisation and SMOTE filters. The .csv dataset was loaded into WEKA, 
converted to .arrf file and the numeric to nominal filter applied to ensure all entries were stored in nominal format. A sampling 
strategy was considered. It was identified that there was a class imbalance for malicious and benign class (64, 140, 65, 33 and 36 
malicious/benign events distributed across the dataset), Figure 3. (Haixiang et al., 2017) acknowledge that ML algorithms are 
typically sensitive to detecting majority class and not minority. Therefore, a balanced dataset was used. Class imbalance can be 
rectified by oversampling the minority class or by under sampling the majority class depending on which event is to be identified. 
Over-sampling can reduce performance for large datasets and introduces the possibility of overfitting if data is not randomised. 
Under-sampling introduces the possibility of removing important data when a minority class is particularly low, reducing the 
amount of data available for training, testing and cross-validation. In this paper, both over and under sampling techniques will be 
evaluated to ensure benign activity and IoT attacks will have the best opportunity of being detected. We used SMOTE filter to 
over sample events 1, 3, 4 and 5 (Rank & Version, Rank & Blackhole, Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Sybil attacks) so each 
event had approximately 135 instances, Figure 4. Each time SMOTE filter sampled it placed new instances at the bottom of the 
dataset introducing a possible overfitting. Therefore, at the end of the filtering process data was randomised with a separate filter. 
Oversampling with SMOTE increased total instances from 338 to 674. We also used Spread Sub Sample filter to under sample 
events 1, 2, 3 and 5 (Rank & Version, benign events, Rank & Blackhole and Rank & Sybil attacks) so that each event had 33 
instances, Figure 5. To adjust filter settings, random seed was set to 1 to ensure that each sample was randomised. Under sampling 
decreased total instances from 338 – 165. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Class Imbalance Malicious/Benign Class 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: SMOTE Oversample Malicious/Benign Class 
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Attacks
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Rank & Sybil
Attacks
SMOTE (Oversampling)
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Figure 5: Spread Sub Sample (Undersample) Malicious/Benign Class 
 
2.4. Training, Testing and Cross-validation 
To produce a classifier, data is processed through a ML algorithm. Once a classifier is produced data is processed through the 
classifier generating results for evaluation. It is important that data processed through the ML algorithm and classifier are not from 
the same dataset. This project is resourced with one simulation dataset; therefore, the dataset must be split into training, testing and 
cross-validation sets. Training data contains 70% of total instances with the remaining 30% split equally between testing and cross-
validation sets. WEKA does not have direct functionality to do this so the resample filter was exploited to achieve the aim for both 
SMOTE and Spread Sub Sample datasets. 
 
3. Machine Learning Algorithms and Classifiers 
WEKA was used to train, test and cross-validate our selected five classifiers: Naïve Bayes (NB), Support Vector Machines 
(SVM), Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), Random Forest (RF) and ZeroR classifiers. ZeroR was used to determine a performance 
baseline. 
NB was the first model to be built in WEKA and was completed using default settings to take the product of probabilities 
providing a forecast ratio to identify likely outcomes. NB’s default options were not altered since the dataset was in nominal format. 
Therefore, “useKernelEstimator” and “useSupervisedDiscretization” were not required to be changed. 
When developing SVM parameters, it is important to understand that the model is designed to separate classifiers using a 
boundary. When using WEKA’s LibSVM classifier, setting a suitable boundary allowed the generalisation of a training dataset to 
be more accurate. This was achieved by optimising parameters setting cost to “C” and kernel type to “gamma”, relating to X and 
Y axis respectively. 
Default MLP settings were applied during the initial classifier model and subsequently tuned to enhance results. A critical 
parameter that was evaluated was hidden layers. Hidden layer parameter within WEKA can be used to train data on attributes, 
classes or combinations of attributes and classes. This parameter can also be adjusted to determine the number of layers within the 
MLP model. The MLP model used for experimentation consisted of three layers trained on both attributes and classifiers. 
Increasing training time from 500 – 2000 epochs improved results allowing backpropagation and a multi-layer approach more time 
to train each MLP layer. 
When developing the RF algorithm consideration was made to the depth of the tree and number of features to be randomly 
selected. The default setting was applied, the depth of tree set, and number of features set to 0 (unlimited depth). When processing 
large datasets these values can be set to reduce the depth of the tree and number of features to enhance the performance of the 
classifier. Since the dataset is relatively small the RF classifier was able to process data with unlimited depth and features providing 
best results overall. 
 
4. Classifier Ensemble 
Classifier ensemble techniques were used to gain highly accurate ML classifications through the combination of multiple ML 
algorithms. The parameters of AdaBoost, Bagging and Stacking were researched, and experiments conducted with ML algorithms 
but were unable to improve results beyond single classifiers. Voting was used successfully. Additionally, classifier and 
combination rule parameters were amended. However, optimum results were obtained setting classifier to “MPL and RF” with 
combination rule set to “Average of Probabilities”. For all classifier models, excluding NB since the option is not available, seed 
was set to zero ensuring random number generation was not conducted so comparison of results would be consistent. 
 
5. Feature Selection 
For the purpose of practical investigation feature selection was split into the following areas: all dataset metrics, network metrics 
and power metrics. Each of these areas were evaluated during experiments 2 – 4 to understand which features provided greatest 
detection. Feature selection was developed further during experiment 5 removing attacks that were not detectable based on power 
consumption metrics. 
33 33 33 33 33
Rank & Version
Attacks
Benign Events Rank &
Blackhole
Attacks
Decreased Path
Metric Attacks
Rank & Sybil
Attacks
Spread Sub Sample (Undersample) 
 11 
This section outlined the implementation of the CRISP-DM process based on the steps described during research methodology. 
The application of data exploration, pre-processing, ML classifiers, classifier ensemble, and feature selection have been described 
in detail and results will be presented in the next section. 
V. RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
There were eight simulated experiments conducted to capture results for discussion. The experiments were designed to 
understand how ML can be used to detect a combination of attacks against OF0 and MRHOF based on power consumption and 
network metrics. The experiments were also designed to understand the impact normalisation, sampling, feature selection and 
classifier ensemble techniques have on results. The classifier ZeroR was used to determine a performance baseline as a reference 
to consider when comparing NB, SVM, MLP and RF algorithms. The baseline confirmed malicious and benign classifier prediction 
at 20.59% which is reasonable since there is a single benign behaviour and four attacks. Each experiment becomes more complex 
during investigation to deliver results and understand whether the aims of this study have been achieved. 
 
✓ Experiment 1 – Pre-processed Dataset: All Attributes and Metrics 
The aim of Experiment 1 is to create classifiers for each ML algorithm based on a pre-processed dataset considering all attributes 
and metrics. This means considering both power and network parameters from our novel dataset. Results are captured in Table 6 
using 10-fold cross-validation techniques for both SMOTE and Spread Sub Sample balancing methods.  
 
The overall aim of Experiment 1 is to: 
• Compare each classifier against ZeroR 
• Compare results from balancing techniques 
• Carry results forward to experiment 2 for comparison against a normalised dataset 
Correctly classified instances alone can lead to inaccurate results when evaluating ML algorithms and classifiers. However, for 
Experiment 1, this was considered a suitable evaluation tool for comparison against ZeroR classifier at a measurement of 20.59%.  
As can be seen in Table 6, for SMOTE and Spread Sub Sample balancing techniques, each classifier improved performance on 
ZeroR with the exception of Sub Sample – SVM. Additionally, SMOTE outperformed Sub Sampling for this experiment. These 
results will be considered against normalised pre-processed datasets for all attributes and metrics in Experiment 2.  
 
Table 6: Experiment 1 Results 
 Correctly Classified 
Instances (%) 
Balancing Technique 
Average (%) 
ZeroR  20.59 20.59 
SMOTE – NB 86.14 73.76 
SMOTE – SVM 34.65 
SMOTE – MLP 91.09 
SMOTE – RF 83.17 
Sub Sample – NB 52.00 34.00 
Sub Sample – SVM 12.00 
Sub Sample – MLP 24.00 
Sub Sample – RF 48.00 
 
✓ Experiment 2 – Normalisation: All Attributes and Metrics 
The aim of Experiment 2 is to create classifiers for each ML algorithm based on a normalised pre-processed dataset for all 
attributes and metrics. This means considering both power and network parameters from our novel dataset. Results are captured in 
Table 7 using 10-fold cross validation techniques for both SMOTE and Spread Sub Sample balancing techniques.  
 
The overall aim of Experiment 2 is to: 
• Compare each classifier against Experiment 1 results to understand the impact of normalisation 
• Compare balancing techniques on the overall performance of classifiers 
• Identify highly efficient algorithms for detecting specific attacks 
• Carry results forward to Experiment 3 and 4 to compare against network and power metrics 
Correctly classified instances will be used initially to compare the value normalisation plays within ML. We considered Root 
Mean Square Error (RSME), Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC), correctly 
classified instances and confusion matrix as evaluation metrics for Experiments 2 – 6.  
As can be seen in Table 7, for SMOTE and Spread Sub Sample, balancing each classifier post pre-processing and normalisation 
improved performance on Experiment 1 with the exception of SMOTE – NB. Additionally, in Experiment 2, SMOTE outperformed 
Sub Sampling and SMOTE – MLP outperforms all other classifiers.  
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We have also observed the confusion matrix and accuracy by class which resulted in the recognition of highly efficient 
algorithms for detecting specific attacks for each classifier.  
The following highly efficient algorithms were identified: SMOTE – NB for Decreased Path Metric attacks with a ROC of 0.99, 
SMOTE – MLP for Rank & Blackhole attacks with a ROC of 1.00 (Rank & Version and Decreased Path Metric attacks scored 
ROC 0.99) and SMOTE – RF for detecting all attacks with a ROC in excess of 0.99 for each.  
These results will be considered against network and power metrics in Experiment 3 & 4 with a focus on ROC average, to 
determine performance of a classifier. Overall, in Experiment 2, MLP and RF algorithms performed best when balancing and 
normalisation had been oversampled, Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Experiment 2 Results 
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ZeroR N/A N/A N/A 20.59 20.59 
SMOTE – NB 0.23 24.22 0.98 84.31 87.99 
SMOTE – SVM 0.27 22.01 0.89 82.35 
SMOTE – MLP 0.16 10.15 0.99 93.14 
SMOTE – RF 0.16 20.48 0.99 92.16 
Sub Sample – NB 0.32 41.90 0.88 68.00 65.00 
Sub Sample – SVM 0.51 79.83 0.64 36.00 
Sub Sample – MLP 0.29 31.20 0.91 76.00 
Sub Sample – RF 0.28 55.86 0.94 80.00 
 
✓ Experiment 3 – Normalisation: Network Attributes and Metrics 
The aim of Experiment 3 is to create classifiers for each ML algorithm based on a normalised pre-processed dataset for network 
attributes and metrics. Results are captured in Table 8 using 10-fold cross validation techniques for both SMOTE and Spread Sub 
Sample balancing techniques.  
 
The overall aim of Experiment 3 is to: 
• Compare each classifier against Experiment 2 results to understand the significance of network attributes and metrics on 
a classifiers performance 
• Compare balancing techniques 
• Identify highly efficient algorithms for detecting specific attacks 
• Carry results forward to Experiment 4 to compare against power metrics 
As seen in Table 8, reducing the dataset to only include network metrics improved performance for all classifiers during  
Experiment 3 with the exception of SMOTE – RF. Additionally, SMOTE outperformed Spread Sub Sampling technique. Moreover, 
highly efficient algorithms for detecting specific attacks using confusion matrix were: SMOTE – NB, SMOTE - MLP and SMOTE 
- RF which detected each attack with a ROC in excess of 0.99. SMOTE – MLP successfully identified Rank and Blackhole attacks 
100% of the time with no errors. These results will be considered against power metrics in Experiment 4. 
 
 
Table 8: Experiment 3 Results 
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SMOTE – NB 0.19 19.13 0.99 86.28 88.68 
SMOTE – SVM 0.25 19.67 0.90 84.29 
SMOTE – MLP 0.15 11.15 0.99 93.07 
SMOTE – RF 0.18 24.58 0.99 91.09 
Sub Sample – NB 0.30 40.63 0.92 76.00 71.00 
Sub Sample – SVM 0.47 69.85 0.69 44.00 
Sub Sample – MLP 0.28 29.25 0.94 76.00 
Sub Sample – RF 0.25 51.16 0.96 88.00 
 
✓ Experiment 4 – Normalisation: Power Attributes and Metrics 
The aim of Experiment 4 is to create classifiers for each ML algorithm based on a normalised, pre-processed dataset for power 
attributes and metrics. Results are captured using 10-fold cross validation techniques for both SMOTE and Spread Sub Sample 
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balancing techniques.  
 
The overall aim of Experiment 4 is to: 
• Compare each classifier against Experiment 2 and 3 results to understand the significance of power attributes and 
metrics on the classifier performance 
• Compare balancing techniques 
• Identify highly efficient algorithms for detecting specific attacks for classifier ensemble 
• Carry results forward to Experiment 5 to compare against classifier ensemble techniques to improve performance for 
power metrics 
 
As can be seen in Table 9, reducing the dataset to only include power metrics significantly decreased performance for all 
classifiers during Experiment 4. It is worth noting that despite reducing the performance significantly each classifier performed 
better than the ZeroR baseline of 20.59%, demonstrating that power metrics obtain predictive power. Additionally, SMOTE 
outperformed Sub Sampling techniques.  
Given the confusion matrix, there were no highly efficient classifiers for detecting specific attacks. However, there were some 
moderately efficient classifiers that should be considered for evaluation during Experiment 5 and 6.  
Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version attacks were detected based on power consumption metrics during Experiment 4. 
SMOTE – NB detected Decreased Path Metric attack with a ROC of 0.90. SMOTE – MLP detected Decreased Path Metric and 
Rank & Version attacks with a ROC of 0.91 and 0.94 respectively. SMOTE – RF detected Decreased Path Metric and Rank & 
Version attacks with a ROC of 0.93 and 0.96 respectively.  
In conclusion, decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version attacks were detected based on power consumption metrics during 
Experiment 4. 
 
Table 9: Experiment 4 Results 
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SMOTE – NB 0.38 73.45 0.80 47.06 52.45 
SMOTE – SVM 0.45 63.58 0.70 49.02 
SMOTE – MLP 0.33 61.44 0.86 55.88 
SMOTE – RF 0.33 62.01 0.86 57.84 
Sub Sample – NB 0.25 78.88 0.73 32.00 37.00 
Sub Sample – 
SVM 
0.52 84.82 0.60 32.00 
Sub Sample – 
MLP 
0.42 79.08 0.71 40.00 
Sub Sample – RF 0.43 77.07 0.68 44.00 
 
✓ Experiment 5 – Feature Selection 
The aim of Experiment 5 is to use feature selection based on the results of Experiment 4. NB, MLP and RF algorithms will be 
considered with SMOTE sampling. It was clear that Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version attacks were detectable based on 
power consumption metrics. Investigating results of Rank & Blackhole and Rank & Sybil attacks, it is likely that using ML to 
detect specific attacks against OF0 and MRHOF based on power consumption may not be possible.  
 
The overall aim of Experiment 5 is to: 
• Remove Rank & Blackhole and Rank & Sybil features from the dataset 
• Identify highly efficient algorithms for detecting Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version attacks based on power 
consumption for use in Experiment 6 
 
Table 10: Experiment 5 Results 
 RSME MAPE 
(%) 
ROC 
Average 
Correctly 
Classified 
Instances (%) 
SMOTE – NB 0.32 59.61 0.85 68.33 
SMOTE – MLP 0.12 44.20 0.91         75.00 
SMOTE – RF 0.26 46.28 0.91 73.33 
 
As can be seen in Table 10 and after considering evaluation metrics, MLP performed best based on power consumption metrics 
post feature selection. It is noted that RF performed similarly to MLP with a larger RSME margin.  
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Given the confusion matrix, the following highly efficient algorithms for detecting Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version 
attacks were identified: SMOTE – NB detected Decreased Path Metric attack with ROC of 0.93. SMOTE – MLP detected 
Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version attacks with a ROC of 0.89 and 0.90 respectively. SMOTE – RF detected Decreased 
Path Metric and Rank & Version attacks with ROC of 0.89 and 0.91 respectively.  
Overall, Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version detection improved significantly based on power consumption metrics post 
feature selection and MLP performed best in total. 
 
✓ Experiment 6 – Classifier Ensemble 
The aim of Experiment 6 is to exploit AdaBoost, Bagging, Stacking and Voting classifier ensemble methods to increase the 
likelihood of detecting Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version attacks based on power consumption metrics.  
 
The overall aim of this experiment is to: 
• Use AdaBoost and Bagging classifier techniques to increase the likelihood of detection 
• Use Stacking and Voting classifiers for classifier ensemble 
 
As can be seen in Table 11, AdaBoost, Bagging and Stacking while utilising NB, MLP and RF classifiers, were unable to 
increase performance beyond what had already been captured during Experiment 5. Voting was established using combinations of 
NB, MLP, RF, and SVM.  
Table 11: Experiment 6 Results 
 RSME MAPE 
(%) 
ROC 
Average 
Correctly 
Classified 
Instances (%) 
Voting – MLP 
and RF 
0.24 45.60 0.92 84.21 
Voting – 
SVM and NB 
0.32 53.51 0.87           69.47 
 
A combination of MLP and RF with minimum probability selected as the combination rule provided the best results. Addressing 
the confusion matrix, voting with MLP and RF classifiers detected Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version attacks with a ROC 
of 0.86 and 0.96 respectively. Voting with SVM and NB classifiers detected Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version attacks 
with a ROC of 0.81 and 0.91 respectively. Overall, Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version detection improved significantly 
based on power consumption metrics post classifier ensemble utilising Voting with MLP and RF. 
 
✓ Experiment 7 – Detecting Attacks Against MRHOF and OF0 
The aim of Experiment 7 is to understand the success rates of detecting attacks against MRHOF and OF0. As the most successful 
classifier identified during experimentation, MLP will be used to assess if there is any difference in detecting attacks against the 
two objective functions.  
 
The overall aim of this experiment is to: 
• Assess success rate of detection for MRHOF and OF0 for network and power metrics 
• Assess success rate of detection for MRHOF and OF0 for network metrics 
• Assess success rate of detection for MRHOF and OF0 for power metrics post feature selection 
 
Experiment 7 was designed to understand the success rate of detecting attacks against MRHOF and OF0. For each experiment, 
MRHOF and OF0 instances were removed independently of one another allowing the MLP classifier to train, test and cross validate 
results. MLP was used to assess if there was any variance in detecting attacks between the two objective functions. All network 
and power metrics were considered initially, removing MRHOF and OF0 instances independently of one another, with malicious 
and benign activity remaining as the selected class.  
Removing MRHOF reduced instances to 178. Removing OF0 reduced instances to 293. As can be seen in Table 12, the ML 
model was better at detecting attacks against MRHOF than it was against OF0.  
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Table 12: Experiment 7 Results 
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OF0 MLP ALL 0.40 54.21 0.75 55.88 49.67 
MLP 
NETWORK 
0.39 52.85 0.80 56.86 
MLP 
POWER 
0.43 80.70 0.66 36.28 
MRHOF MLP ALL 0.22 21.17 0.97 84.31 71.24 
MLP 
NETWORK 
0.21 19.34 0.97 87.25 
MLP 
POWER 
0.42 77.20 0.71 42.16 
 
✓ Experiment 8 – Detecting Attacks Against MRHOF and OF0 with a Balanced Class 
The aim of Experiment 8 is to understand the success rates of detecting attacks against MRHOF and OF0 with a balanced class. 
As the most successful classifier identified during Experiment 7, MLP using network metrics will be used to assess if there is any 
difference in detecting attacks against the two objective functions. The overall aim of this experiment is to: 
 
• Assess success rate of detection for MRHOF and OF0 with a balanced class for network metrics 
  
Before each experiment, MRHOF and OF0 were balanced using SMOTE oversampling technique. Instances were then removed 
independently of one another allowing the MLP classifier to train, test and cross validate results. 
 
Table 13: Experiment 8 Results 
 RSME MAPE 
(%) 
ROC 
Average 
Correctly Classified 
Instances (%) 
OF0 MLP NETWORK METRICS 0.38 52.82 0.75 57.84 
MRHOF MLP NETWORK METRICS 0.21 19.34 0.97 87.26 
 
In general, Experiment 8 was designed to understand the success rate of detecting attacks against balanced MRHOF and balanced 
OF0 objective functions. This experiment builds on results captured during Experiment 7 to understand if MLP classifier is better 
at detecting combined attacks against MRHOF than OF0. As can be seen in Table 13, the ML model was better at detecting attacks 
against MRHOF than it was against OF0 despite objective function being balanced. This supports findings identified during 
Experiment 7.  
VI. DISCUSSIONS  
In this section, the research questions stated at the beginning of this paper are addressed as follows. 
 
• RQ1. Is there an available IoT dataset that is suitable to meet the research scope, or is the development of a novel dataset 
required? 
(Alam et al., 2016) and (Buczak and Guven, 2015) discuss research into ML, IDS and IoT, identifying that DARPA and KDD 
datasets are often used since collecting, labelling and pre-processing IoT data is difficult and time consuming. A novel approach 
was taken to identify and develop a dataset focused on IoT features and attacks. The raw dataset that we provided in this paper 
included IoT features and attacks. Pre-processing, normalisation and sampling of raw data was time consuming; however, it was 
worthwhile. Furthermore, the novel dataset can be shared for further research in this field since correctly labelled IoT datasets are 
a scarce resource within the research community. The dataset contained a number of limitations that could be improved upon in 
future to enhance performance. Dataset limitations are discussed in the next section.  
 
RQ1 answer summary: In this paper, a novel dataset was developed focused on IoT features and attacks.  
 
• RQ2. What is the impact of pre-processing, normalisation, feature selection, and sampling on classifier performance? 
(Yin and Gai, 2015) discuss challenges to be considered when developing an imbalanced dataset with a focus on pre- processing, 
normalisation, sampling and feature selection. Experiments 1, 2 and 5 were designed to understand the impact pre-processing, 
normalisation and feature selection have on performance. Experiments 1 – 4 were designed to understand sampling strategy. 
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Experiment 1 and 2 concluded that each classifier post pre-processing and normalisation improved performance by 19.29% on 
average based on balancing techniques for each ML algorithm. Experiments 1 – 4 concluded that SMOTE performed better than 
Spread Sub Sample by 46.32% on average based on balancing techniques. Experiment 5 concluded that feature selection can be 
used to remove IoT attacks that were not relevant to detection through power consumption metrics. Post feature selection, including 
the removal of Rank & Blackhole and Rank & Sybil attacks, the attack detection is increased by 29.67% based on correctly 
classified instances. 
RQ2 answer summary: Pre-processing, normalisation, feature selection and sampling techniques are critical processes that 
provide significant impact on overall ML performance. 
• RQ3. What is the most successful deployment of ML algorithms and classifiers? 
(Haq et al., 2015) reviewed 49 related studies and discuss classifier deployments including single and ensemble methodologies. 
SVM is identified as the most common algorithm for IDS. When considering classifier ensemble Neutral Network and Fuzzy 
Logic combinations are most common. Results from Experiments 2, 3 and 5 concluded that MLP, followed closely by RF, was the 
most successful ML model for time series events with SVM performing worst in contrast to (Haq et al., 2015). Table 14 presents 
average results from experiments 2, 3 and 5 for RSME, MAPE, ROC and correctly classified instances displaying overall 
performance.  
Overall performance of ML algorithms appeared less accurate than (Napiah et al., 2018) at 99.44% and in some instances 
(Nannan et al., 2018) at 86.78%, since power statistics have been included, lowering average results significantly. Including the 
power metric results was important since they provide an honest evaluation of the project and results can be developed upon in 
future research resolving limitations. 
RQ3 answer summary: Classifier ensemble voting technique, using the top two performing models MLP and RF, was the most 
successful deployment of ML algorithms and classifiers with a ROC of 0.97. 
 
Table 14: Overall Performance of ML Algorithm 
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Voting (MLP and 
RF) 
0.19 21.38 0.97 87.08 1 
MLP 0.14 21.83 0.96 87.07 2 
RF 0.20 30.45 0.96 85.53 3 
NB 0.25 34.17 0.94 79.64 4 
SVM 0.32 30.09 0.83 71.89 5 
 
• RQ4. Are ML algorithms more successful in detecting combined attacks against MRHOF or OF0? 
 (Airehrour et al., 2018) and (Mehta and Parma, 2018) identify a gap in research regarding IDS for combinations of IoT attacks 
using ML. Confusion matrices for MLP and RF were reviewed to understand what attacks were successfully detected based on 
network and power metrics. Reviewing network metrics, it was identified that Rank & Blackhole attacks were detected 100% of 
the time with no errors. Other attacks were detected successfully based on network metrics with a ROC score of 0.99 or above. 
Overall performance was reduced as benign activity was often incorrectly classified as an attack with a ROC score of 0.96 and 
precision rate of 78.15%. As indicated during the conclusion of Experiment 4, Rank & Blackhole and Rank & Sybil attacks were 
not successfully detected based on power metrics with true positive rates of 33.33% and 50.00%, respectively.  
Reviewing confusion matrices for MLP and RF in Experiment 6, it was clear that the ensemble techniques significantly enhanced 
performance beyond results captured during Experiment 4 taking power metrics into consideration. Overall performance was 
improved from 57.84% correctly classified instances with a ROC of 0.86 to 84.21% and 0.93 respectively. Demonstrating power 
metrics can be used to detect a combination of IoT attacks. Decreased Path Metric and Rank & Version attacks were detected with 
true positive rates of 70.00% and 81.31%, respectively.  
 
RQ4 answer summary: The ML algorithms were better at detecting attacks against equally balanced MRHOF than OF0. 
VII. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper aims to detect IoT combined attacks of: Rank & Version, Rank & Blackhole, Decreased Path Metric, as well as Rank 
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& Sybil against two IoT’s popular objective functions of OF0 & MRHOF using machine learning algorithms. This aim was 
stablished based on a comprehensive gap analysis across high quality research papers in the field. In order to successfully achieve 
this aim and due to lack of suitable IoT datasets, a novel dataset was developed focused on IoT’s network and power features as 
well as IoT combined attacks. Pre-processing, normalisation, feature selection and sampling were identified as critical processes 
significantly impacting performance. Voting as a classifier ensemble technique, using top performing models MLP and RF, was 
identified as the most successful deployment of ML classifiers. Specific attacks were detected successfully based on network and 
power metrics; benign activity was also detected successfully and could be employed to prevent zero-day IoT attacks. The ML 
model was better at detecting attacks against equally balanced MRHOF than OF0. Addressing our captured results, our machine 
learning approach was successful in detecting all combined attacks against OF0 and MRHOF based on the network and power 
metrics in which MLP and RF algorithms were the most successful classifier deployment for single and ensemble models.   
 
Although our initial aims were achieved, there were limitations in research and simulated experiments that present opportunities 
for future researchers to consider. Areas of the project that provide opportunities in future include the continued development of 
an IoT dataset, ML algorithms and classifiers, sampling, feature selection and novel MRHOF, OF0 and RPL attacks. For instance, 
our dataset contained four implemented combined attacks that were successfully identified using network metrics. Only two 
combined attacks were able to be detected using power metrics. It is recommended that further research is conducted to understand 
attacks that can be identified by power metrics, for instance Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. We recommend the 
implementation of an IoT sensor lab in order to produce a large IoT dataset based on project limitations. Additionally, the literature 
review acknowledged a large range of MRHOF and OF0 attacks that could be used to meet project scope. The selected attacks 
were useful for detecting network metrics but provided limited success based on power metrics. It is recommended that a wider 
range of MRHOF and OF0 attacks are included in future datasets with a focus on those attacks that impact power metrics. 
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